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Abstract
In this paper we introduce three different implementations for the Mondex electronic purse ver-
ification challenge [Woo06] [SCW00]. In previous work ([SGHR06] [SGH+07] and [HSGR06])
we verified security and correctness properties of the Mondex money transfer protocol. Here we
present a way to translate the formal specifications into running JavaCard code. We introduce
three different ways to implement the protocol, one using symmetric cryptography, one using
asymmetric cryptography and finally one using special datatypes for cryptographic protocols and




Mondex [MCI] cards are smart cards which can be used as electronic purses. They store money
and can be used to transfer money from one card to another.
The Mondex case study recently received a lot of attention because its formal verification is
seen as a challenge for verification tools [Woo06]. The original specification [SCW00] made in Z
[Spi92], the proofs were made by hand with an enourmous effort. In [SGHR06] we have shown
that this verification can now be done in a few weeks using the elaborated verification support
of the interactive theorem prover KIV [KIVb]. In [SGH+07] (resp. the corresponding technical
report [SGH+06]) we describe a weakness of the communication protocol of Mondex which allows
a denial of service attack against the cards. There we also show that a slight modification of the
protocol corrects this error and verify the modified protocol. Furthermore, the original Mondex
specification does not contain any formalization of cryptographic operations. Instead it simply
assumes that certain (critical) protocol messages cannot be forged. In [HSGR06] we extend the
abstract protocol of Mondex with cryptographic operations and verify that the new protocol is
actually a refinement of the original abstract protocol.
All our specifications of the Mondex case study are given as Abstract State Machines [Gur95]
[BS03] and all refinements use the ASM Refinement Theory [BR95] [Sch01] [Bo¨r03] [Sch05]. Figure
1.1 shows an overview of our specification levels for the case study.
The logical consequence of this development approach for Mondex is the refinement of the
abstract specifications down to running source code (the last level in Fig. 1.1).
We chose the JavaCard programming language and Java SmartCards as a platform. In this paper
we present three different ways to implement the abstract protocol of Mondex.
The first version implements the protocol using symmetric cryptography. This approach follows
the specifications given in the communication protocol level (the concrete level of the original
Mondex work) in Figure 1.1 very closely. It is introduced in Section 2.
Using only symmetric cryptography has some weaknesses. For example, all security proper-
ties rely on the fact that the secret key is unknown to an attacker. This means if one card is
compromised then all cards would be compromised. Therefore, our second implementation uses
asymmetric cryptography to address those weaknesses. This implementation also follows the com-
munication protocol level of Fig. 1.1, but has some little modifications. The reason is that in
reality message lengths for smart cards are bounded, so you cannot send very long input messages
(such as signatures) together with some other data. This will be explained in Section 3.
Finally, our last implementation for Mondex uses symmetric cryptography and special protocol
data types. It is the result of the consequent development using stepwise refinement and therefore
follows the specification of the security protocol level very closely. This implementation follows
our general approach for security protocol code refinement as described in [GHRS06] [GSR06b].
The corresponding code will be explained in Section 4.
This paper is a follow-up for [SGHR06], [SGH+07] and [HSGR06]. We will not repeat all
the details about the specification levels ”transactions”, ”communication protocol” and ”security
















Figure 1.1: Overall structure of our Mondex refinement approach
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Chapter 2
A Protocol using symmetric
Cryptography
2.1 Implementation
The basis for the following implementation is the specification of the Mondex communication
protocol level as shown in Fig. 1.1.
On the communication protocol level transferring money is done using a protocol with 5 steps
(for details see also [SGHR06]). To execute the protocol each purse needs a status that indicates
how far it has progressed in the execution of the protocol steps. The possible states a purse
may be in are given by the enumeration status = idle | epr | epv | epa. Purses not participating in
any transfer are in the idle state. To avoid replay attacks each purse stores a sequence number
nextSeqNo that is used in the next transaction. This number is incremented at the start of every
protocol run. The current amount of money stored on the card is given by the field balance.
During the run of the protocol each purse stores the current payment details (paydetails). These
are tuples consisting of the names of the from and to purse, the sequence numbers they use and
the amount of money that is transferred. The state of a purse also contains a log exLog of failed
transfers represented by their payment details.
This state is now implemented in an applet class for a Java Smart Card. Our class implementing
the communication protocol is called Purse. Its definition and its fields (representing the ASM
state functions of [SGHR06]) is given as:
public class Purse extends Applet {
. . .
// p ro t o co l f i e l d s
private short balance ;
private byte [ ] name ;
private short seqNo ;
private byte s t a t e ;
// pay d e t a i l s and excep t i on l o g
private byte [ ] currentPD ;
private byte [ ] ex log ;
private short currentExLogIndex ;
// key
private DESKey sharedkeyobj ;
. . .
}
The actual money balance of the card is represented as a short value (our JavaCards do not
support integers). The name is given as a byte array of 8 bytes. The sequence number (seqNo) is
also a short value. Payment details (currentPD) are given as a byte array containing the same in-
formation as the abstract data type paydetails above. The currentPD array is 22 bytes long: 2 * 8
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bytes are used to store the two card names (from and to), 2 * 2 bytes are used for the two sequence
numbers (fromno and tono) and 2 bytes are used for the amount of money to be transferred (value).
The exception log (exlog) which is a list of paydetails in the specification is implemented as a byte
array of length 5 * 22. This is sufficient to store 5 PayDetails one after another. The next free
index in this exception log array is given by the field currentExLogIndex. Additionally, we have to
consider encryption. The ASM communication protocol level does not contain any cryptographic
operations. Messages are simply considered to be unforgeable. Of course, when giving an imple-
mentation, cryptography has to be used. The cryptographic protocol for the symmetric version of
Mondex written in a commonly used standard notation for cryptographic protocols [Car94] is:
1. terminal → from : STARTFROM, seqNo(to), name(to), amount
2. from → to : {STARTTO, seqNo(from), name(from), amount}KS
3. to → from : {REQ,paydetails}KS
4. from → to : {VAL,paydetails}KS
5. to → from : {ACK,paydetails}KS
The secret key KS is shared between all Mondex cards. In our implementation, this key is given
by the field sharedkeyobj as an object of type DESKey (representing a 3DES symmetric key). An
overview of the protocol on the concrete level is shown in Fig. 2.1.


























Figure 2.1: An overview of the Mondex protocol
The first message getName+SeqNo+Bal (shown by dashed lines in Fig. 2.1) is needed in a real
implementation of the Mondex scenario, since the terminal must be able to get the information
about card names, their sequence numbers and balances. This information is used in the next
protocol step startFrom.
When using Java SmartCards, communication is based on byte arrays. Smart cards commu-
nicate using Application Protocol Data Units (APDU). APDUs are byte arrays which consist of
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a header and a data part. The header is 5 bytes long and contains an instruction byte and length
information. Each message sent to a smart card will be transformed by the JCRE (the operating
system of the smart card) in a parameter for the process(APDU) method defined in the applet
class implementing the protocol. The message format for our symmetric implementation is given
in the following table (header information is omitted. Only the instruction byte is given as the
first part of each message):




StartFrom SF + name(to) ST
+ seqNo(to) + amount + { ST + name(from)
+ seqNo(from) + amount}KS
StartTo ST REQ
+ { ST + name(from) + { REQ + paydetails}KS
+ seqNo(from) + amount}KS
Req REQ VAL
+ { REQ + paydetails }KS + {VAL + paydetails}KS
Val VAL ACK
+ {VAL + paydetails}KS + {ACK + paydetails}KS
Ack ACK -
+ { ACK + paydetails }KS
GetExLog GEL {name + exlog}KB
DeleteExlog DEL -
+ {DEL + exlog}KB
Additionally to the original money transfer protocol we implemented the archiving functionality
for the exception log. The exception log can be sent to the bank (using a key KB shared between
the banking server and all Mondex cards). When receiving the encrypted exception log of a card,
the server decrypts it, stores the log in its internal database, encrypts it again using the same key
and sends it back to the card. When the card receives this encrypted message it decrypts it and
checks whether the transmitted exception log and its own exception log match. If they do the
card can be sure that the server got the exception log and can safely delete it.
The full implementation of the protocol can be found in appendix A. In the following we will
describe the implementation of the protocol step val as an example. The implementations of the
other protocol steps are similar to this.
The input message for val is VAL + {VAL + currentPD}sharedkey . The card is supposed
to be in the EPV (”expecting value”) state. The relevant part of the main protocol method
process(APDU) for our implementation is:
public void proce s s (APDU arg0 ) throws ISOException {
JCSystem . beg inTransact ion ( ) ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
byte i n s = bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] ;
i f ( i n s == ISO7816 . INS SELECT)
return ;
else i f ( . . . )
. . .
else i f ( s t a t e == EPV && in s == VAL
&& checkStep ( arg0 , VAL) )
va l ( arg0 ) ;




abort ( ) ;
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
ISOException . throwIt ( ISO7816 .SWCOMMANDNOTALLOWED) ;
}
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
}
Every protocol step starts with a call of JCSystem.beginTransaction() to ensure that the pro-
tocol step will be finished as a whole or completely rolled back in case of card removal or any
other error. Afterwards, we do a case distinction over the instruction byte and the internal state
of the card to determine which step should be performed. If the applet is in state EPV and the
instruction byte is VAL (as it should be) we additionally have to check whether the (encrypted)
content of the message is wellformed. This is done by the method checkStep(APDU, byte) (which
is reused in the steps REQ and ACK because the checks in those steps are the same):
private boolean checkStep (APDU arg0 , byte i n s ) {
short l = arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
i f ( l != ( short ) 24)
return fa lse ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
decrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 2 4 ) ;
// encrypted i n s t r u c t i o n has to be ok , pay d e t a i l s must
// match
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA] != in s
| | Ut i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) , currentPD ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) != 0)
return fa lse ;
return true ;
}
At first, checkStep tests whether the input data block has the correct length of 24 bytes
(3 encrypted 3DES blocks of length 8 bytes). Then, it decrypts the input buffer in place and
checks whether the contained instruction byte matches the protocol step (it should be VAL here).
Additionally, we have to check whether the pay details contained in the encrypted block match
the local copy of the pay details. This ensures that the current message was sent by the right from
purse. If everything is ok the method returns true. Now, the method val(APDU) is called.
private void va l (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// increment ba lance
balance = ( short ) ( ba lance + Ut i l . getShort ( currentPD ,
index amount ) ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r o ther card
// we can use curren t input bu f f e r , v a l u e s shou ld be
// r i g h t a l r eady
// excep t encryp t ion / i n s t r u c t i o n by t e
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ACK;
bu f f e r [ 5 ] = ACK;
encrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) ( currentPD . l ength + 1 ) ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
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arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 9 ) ;
}
The val protocol step increments the stored balance by the amount currently in transit and
constructs an output message. This is the ACK message for the other card. The current input
buffer is reused, since it already contains the information that is needed (the current pay details).
Only the instruction byte has to be changed (once in the header and once in the encrypted block).
The state is reset to IDLE and the message is sent out. This completes the val protocol step.
If something has gone wrong during the checkStep method or the input instruction or the inter-
nal state do not match, the purse has to abort the current transaction, since obviously something
bad happened (either an attack or a transmission error). This is done by the abort method:
private void abort ( ) {
l og I fNeeded ( ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
private void l og I fNeeded ( ) {
i f ( s t a t e == EPV | | s t a t e == EPA) {
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , exlog ,
currentExLogIndex , ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
currentExLogIndex += ( short ) currentPD . l ength ;
}
}
If the purse is in state EPV or EPA (those two are the only two critical protocol states where
money could be lost), abort has to store the current pay details into the exlog. This is done in the
method logIfNeeded. Logging is performed by copying the current pay details currentPD into the
exlog array at the next free position currentExLogIndex. Afterwards currentExLogIndex has to be
incremented accordingly.
Since we are talking about a real implementation and not (as in the specification of Mondex)
about a list of pay details in the exception log, we have to care about exception log overflows.
This is handled by the checks done when receiving the initial startTo and startFrom messages
which start a new protocol run. Those checks now have to test whether the exlog is currently
full (currentExlogIndex is equal to exlog.length). If this happens, no further protocol run can be
started and the exlog has to be deleted.
2.2 Properties
The desired property for an implementation of Mondex is full functional correctness. When proving
functional correctness additional properties of the program are needed, for example that no runtime
exceptions occur. This is relevant for the logging when the current paydetails are copied to the
exlog array (an ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException may occur here).
Since the abstract specification talks about unbounded data types such as lists or natural
numbers, the presented implementation of Mondex differs a little from its abstract specification.
When implementing the specification the unbounded data types are replaced by finite arrays or
short values. This leads to the necessity of additional checks for overflows (which may occur if
positive values are loaded onto the card) and underflows (which may occur if negative values are
loaded).
That implies that for verification purposes an invariant on the class is needed. E.g. the following
properties for the currentExLogIndex should always hold before and after process1 is called and
should prevent an ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException when logging (using the notation of the Java
calculus in KIV [Ste04] [Ste05] where st.applet is a reference to the Purse applet object):
1Please note that this property is no class invariant, it does not hold before and after logIfNeeded for example.
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(st[st.applet.state] 6= IDLE →
st[st.applet.currentExLogIndex] + 22 < st[st.applet.exlog.length])
∧ (∃ i. 0 ≤ i ∧ i ≤ 5 ∧ st[st.applet.currentExLogIndex] = 22 * i)
If the applet is not in the IDLE state (line 1), the currentExLogIndex is small enough to allow
at least one additional log entry (line 2). Additionally, the currentExLogIndex is always a multiple
of 22 (the currentPD.length) and is at most equal to 5 * 22 bytes (line 3) because this is the
maximum exlog length (supporting five log entries).
The invariant for the balance and the current pay details would at least be:
0 ≤ st[st.applet.balance]
∧ 0 ≤ getShort(st[st.applet.currentPD], 20, st) //amount of money to transfer
∧ (st[st.applet.state] = EPV
→ getShort(st[st.applet.currentPD], 20, st)
+ st[st.applet.balance] ≤ 32767)
∧ (st[st.applet.state] = EPR
→ 0 ≤ st[st.applet.balance]
- getShort(st[st.applet.currentPD], 20, st))
The balance and the amount currently in transit (stored in the currentPD array at index
20, encoded as two bytes) are always positive. Additionally, if there is any value currently in
transit and the purse is in EPV state (meaning that a transaction to this purse is currently going
on), the amount in transit plus the current balance is lower or equal than 32767 (the maximum
positive short value). This will guarantee that no overflow will occur in the val protocol step. The
counterpart to this property is that if the purse is in epr state the amount in transit will not lead
to an underflow of the balance.
Certainly, for verification of functional correctness, much more properties would be needed.
The ones presented in this section should be seen as an example.
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Chapter 3
A Protocol using asymmetric
Cryptography
3.1 Implementation
The implementation of the Mondex protocol introduced in Section 2 using symmetric encryption
has the disadvantage that the same symmetric key is used by all purses. That means, if an at-
tacker is able to find out this key he is able to decrypt all messages that are exchanged between two
arbitrary purses. Thus, to avoid this weakness we implemented a second version of the Mondex
protocol using asymmetric cryptography which is introduced here. Instead of using symmetric
encryption each purse has an asymmetric key pair that is used to sign the data to be sent, i.e. to
guarantee data integrity.
As the implementation of the symmetric version this implementation is based on the specification
of the Mondex communication protocol level. In the specification a predicate authentic : name →
bool is defined which specifies if a purse with name name is authentic. In the asymmetric version
of the protocol the check of authenticity is implemented by verifying that a signature issued by
the bank. Each purse stores a signature Sigprivkey(bank)(pubkey(purse), name(purse)), i.e. the
public key and name of a purse signed by the bank. This implementation fulfils the same security
properties as the symmetric variant but is closer to the specification because of the implemented
check of authenticity.
Another difference between the specification and implementation of the asymmetric protocol is
caused by the fact that the length of messages sent to resp. from Java SmartCards is restricted to
255 bytes. Since the startFrom and startTo messages of the asymmetric protocol are longer than
255 bytes, these messages are divided into submessages. Thus, the protocol hast two startFrom
and three startTo messages.
The cryptographic protocol for the asymmetric version of Mondex is:
1. term → from startFrom1 : pubkey(to), name(to), seqNo(to), amount
2. term → from startFrom2 : Sigprivkey(bank)(pubkey(to), name(to))
3. from → to startTo1 : pubkey(from), name(from), seqNo(from), amount
4. from → to startTo2 : Sigprivkey(bank)(pubkey(from), name(from))
5. from → to startTo3 : Sigprivkey(from)(message 3, message 4)
6. to → from REQ : paydetails, Sigprivkey(to)(REQ, paydetails)
7. from → to VAL : paydetails, Sigprivkey(from)(VAL, paydetails)
8. to → from ACK : paydetails, Sigprivkey(to)(ACK, paydetails)
to and from denote the from resp. to purse, term denotes the terminal. pubkey(to), name(to)
and seqNo(to) indicate the public key, name and sequence number of the to purse, amount is
the amount of money that is going to be transfered. privkey(bank) denotes the private key of
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the bank that issues the signatures for all purses. In this implementation the public key of the
bank is known to all purses and stored by each purse in a field bankkey. Sigkey(data) denotes the
signature of data with the key. Paydetails are the details of the current transaction, i.e. name(to),
name(from), seqNo(to), seqNo(from) and amount.
Figure 3.1 shows the communication between the purses and terminal during a protocol run.






































Figure 3.1: An overview of the asymmetric Mondex protocol
After requesting the public key, name, sequence number and signature of the to purse (getName-
SeqNo and getSignature), these values as well as the amount to be transfered are forwarded to the
from purse (startFrom1 and startFrom2 ). The from purse verifies the signature of the to purse
and creates the paydetails of the current transaction. Afterwards it sends its public key, name,
sequence number, amount to be transfered as well as its signature to the to purse (startTo1 and
startTo2 ). Finally, the signature of these two messages is sent to the to purse (startTo3 ). The to
purse verifies both signatures and creates the paydetails of the current transaction. The following
messages, i.e. req, val and ack, are the same as in the specification of the Mondex communication
protocol level with the modification that each message is signed by the sending purse. The fol-
lowing table gives detailed information about the messages that are sent. The format is the same
as the one used in Section 2.





+ pubkey(to) + name(to)
+ seqNo(to) + amount
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StartFrom2 SF2 ST1
+ Sigprivkey(bank)(pubkey(to), + pubkey(from) + name(from)
name(to)) + seqNo(from) + amount
StartTo1 ST1 -
+ pubkey(from) + name(from)














+ Sigprivkey(from)(ST3, + paydetails





+ paydetails + paydetails
+ Sigprivkey(to)(REQ, paydetails) + Sigprivkey(from)(VAL, paydetails)
Val VAL ACK
+ paydetails + paydetails









The implementation has the same fields as the symmetric version (i.e. balance, name, seqNo,
state, currentPD, exlog, exlogCounter), only the keys differ. A purse stores its own private and
public key as well as the public key of the bank. Moreover, the public key of the second purse
participating in the money transfer is stored during the transaction process. All keys are of type
RSAPublicKey resp. RSAPrivateKey. To sign data we use RSA-SHA1 signatures with PKCS1
padding.
The method process that is called when sending a command APDU to the smart card is the same
as the one in the implementation of the symmetric protocol. As in Section 2 we will describe the
protocol step VAL as an example step. The remaining steps are implemented in a similar way.
If a purse receives an APDU with instruction byte VAL, is in state EPV and checkStep(APDU
arg0) returns true, the message val(APDU arg0) is called. In checkStep it is checked if the message
has a length of 150 bytes, i.e. 22 bytes containing the paydetails and 128 bytes for the signature.
Furthermore, the method checks whether the received paydetails are equal to the paydetails stored
by the purse and the signature is verified.
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private boolean checkStep (APDU arg0 , byte i n s ) {
i f ( ! ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == 150)) {
return fa lse ;}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
//compare r e c e i v ed p a y d e t a i l s wi th curren t p a y d e t a i l s
i f ( ! ( U t i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, currentPD ,
( short ) 0 , ( short )22) == 0)) {return fa lse ; }
// copy INS , currentPD to temp
temp [ 0 ] = in s ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 1 , ( short ) 2 2 ) ;
// v e r i f y s i gna tu r e Sig [ o therpurse ] ( INS , currentPD )
s i gn . i n i t ( otherrsapub , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( ! s i gn . v e r i f y ( temp , ( short )0 , ( short )23 , bu f f e r , ( short )
( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 22 ) , ( short ) 128 ) ) {return fa lse ;}
return true ;
}
The method val(APDU arg0) increases the balance of the to purse by the amount of the current
transfer, generates the ACK message and sends it back to the terminal. Therefore, the purse signs
the byte array (ACK, currentPD) and creates the command APDU that is sent to the terminal
and then forwarded to the from purse.
private void va l (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// inc rea se ba lance o f to purse
balance = ( short ) ( ( short ) ba lance + Ut i l . getShort (
currentPD , index amount ) ) ;
// send ack message
// copy currentPD to b u f f e r
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
// c rea t e s i gna tu r e and copy s i gna tu r e to b u f f e r
temp [ 0 ] = ACK;
//temp [ 1 ] . . temp [ 2 2 ] s t o r e s the curren t p a y d e t a i l s ( see method checkStep )
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn . s i gn ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) ( ( short ) currentPD . l ength + ( short ) 1 ) ,
bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ACK; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 150 ; // l en g t h o f data :
// currentPD . l en g t h + s i gna tu r e . l e n g t h
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA, ( short ) 1 5 5 ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
The archiving of exception logs of a purse at the bank and deleting it from the card is implemented
by sending the exception log, the name of the purse as well as the signature Sigprivkey(exlog, name)
to the bank. It is assumed that the bank knows the public key of all purses, verifies the signature
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and archives the received exception log. Afterwards, the bank sends the message DELLOG +
Sigprivkey(bank)(exlog) back to the purse that compares the signed exlog with its own exlog. If
the signature check is successful the purse knows that the bank has stored its log and deletes it.
Otherwise it ignores the message.
The full implementation of the protocol can be found in Appendix B.
3.2 Properties
For the asymmetric version of the protocol the same properties concerning runtime exceptions as
for the symmetric version have to hold. Additionally, one has to consider the temp array that is
used to temporarily store values in the asymmetric implementation. Since some protocol steps
as startFrom and startTo are divided into multiple messages, some values are copied to the temp
array in one method and read from there in another method for signature verification that is called
afterwards. Thus, for functional correctness one has to prove that data that is expected to be




A Protocol using special Data
Types
4.1 Implementation
The last implementation we show is different from the two previous ones. It is based on our generic
refinement approach for security protocols called Prosecco and described in [GHRS06] [HGRS05]
[GSR06a]. [HSGR06] gives an overview of a security protocol specification for the Mondex case
study. It uses a generic security protocol data type called document for the messages and for
the internal state of the cards. The use of such a generic message data type is common in the
literature for security protocol analysis, see e.g. [Pau98]. The following implementation transforms
the document data type to Java classes. Since the communication interface of smart cards is based
on APDUs (which are plain byte arrays), we have to add a transformation layer to the smart card
implementation. This transformation layer is responsible for encoding and decoding Java objects
to byte arrays and sending them using the normal APDU I/O interface. Some details regarding
this transformation and the corresponding layer can be found in [GSR06b].
With the use of such Java classes a proof that the Java source code is a refinement of the
security protocol specification becomes possible. Applying the refinement approach to the source
code of Mondex presented below is current work in progress.
A part of the specification of the document data type is given as an example:
Document = . . . | IntDoc(value : int) | HashDoc(hash : Document) |
EncDoc(key : Key, doc : Document) |
Doclist(docs : Documentlist) | . . .
A document is either an IntDoc that represents an integer, a HashDoc that represents the hash
value of a document, or an EncDoc that represents a document which is encrypted with a key. A
Doclist contains a list of other documents.
Since it must be proven that the implementation produces the same output as the abstract
specification claims (including the same type), a similar distinction of the types of the messages is
crucial for the refinement. When using the Java language it is a natural approach to use objects
for the representation of messages. For example, the implementation for IntDocs is:
public class IntDoc extends Document {
private byte [ ] va lue ;
public IntDoc (byte [ ] va l ) {
value = va l ;
}






The integer value of the abstract type IntDoc is implemented by a byte array which represents
the arbitrary large abstract integer. The other types of documents are described later on. When
using such an implementation for security protocols there must be a method for sending and
receiving the Java document instances.
The full implementation for all document classes as well as the Mondex implementation using
documents can be found in Appendix C. Some explanations can be found in [GSR06b] and
[GSR06a].
Again, we use the val protocol step as an example. At first, we take a look at the implemen-
tation of the state of the purses:
public class Purse{
// s t a t e f i e l d s
private byte [ ] name ;
private short sequenceNo ;
private short balance ;
private byte s t a t e ;
private Doc l i s t pd ;
private short exLogCounter ;
private Doc l i s t [ ] exLog ;
// KEY





The state of the purse is given by a byte array for the name, two shorts for the current sequence
number and the card balance and a byte for the current state (idle, epr, epv, epa) as in the other
two implementations. The current payment details are now implemented by an instance of class
Doclist (which is a list of Documents). The structure of the payment details is illustrated by the
following initialization statement taken from the Purse constructor:
pd = new Doc l i s t (
new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) , // from−purse card name
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) , // from−purse sequence number
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) , // to−purse card name
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) , // to−purse sequence number
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) // amount
} ) ;
The payment details are given as a list of documents (Doclist) consisting of five IntDocs, which
store the relevant values.
The exception log exlog is stored as an array of Doclist instances. The elements of this array
have the same structure as the payment details. The next free index in this exlog array is given
by an exLogCounter, similar as in the previous two implementations.
The implementation uses the same security protocol as the one described in Section 2. For
this protocol [HSGR06] gives a formal specification which uses cryptography. The main idea
behind the implementation here is to adhere to the security protocol specification as good as
possible. Communication in this specification is done by sending documents between the cards.
The implementation now does the same using an implementation of the communication interface
shown below:
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public interface SimpleComm {
public void send (Document d ) ;
public boolean a v a i l a b l e ( ) ;
public Document r e c e i v e ( ) ; }
This interface provides methods to send a document (which means encoding it into an APDU
and sending the APDU), to receive a document (which means decoding of a received APDU into a
document class instance and returning it) and to check, whether some input is currently available
for the card. The implementation of this communication interface uses a TLV encoding style. It
is omitted here but can be downloaded from our website at [KIVa].
We now have a look at the implementation of the main method for executing protocol steps
in class Purse which uses the communication interface above. This is the method step in class
Purse:
public void s tep ( ) {
Document outdoc = null ;
Document indoc = null ;
// check i f t h e r e i s a document in the inbox
i f (comm. av a i l a b l e ( ) )
indoc = comm. r e c e i v e ( ) ;
else return ;
// noth ing r e c e i v ed
i f ( indoc==null ) return ;
// no memory a v a i l a b l e
i f ( exLogCounter == exLog . l ength ) return ;
indoc = checkIndoc ( indoc ) ;
switch ( get InsByte ( indoc ) ) {
case INS START FROM:
. . . ; break ;
case . . . :
. . . ; break ;
case INS VAL :




abort ( ) ; break ;
}
// send outdoc
i f ( outdoc !=null )
comm. send ( outdoc ) ;
}
The method first checks whether some input for the card is available (comm.available()). If
there is some, we receive it as a Document pointer structure. If the input is non-null and the
card’s exception log is not full, we first check if the input document is wellformed. This is done
by the method checkIndoc which checks whether the input document has the correct structure
expected for the current protocol step. E.g. a wellformed val message is an encrypted message
(EncDoc) which contains a Doclist with an IntDoc (with the instruction VAL) and Doclist instance
containing the current payment details (see above). This means checkIndoc first decrypts the
received message with the shared key and then checks the described structure if the instruction
inside the encrypted part was VAL.
After successfully checking the input document, the actual val protocol step is performed by
the val(Document) method:
private Document va l (Document payde t a i l s o th e r ) {




( short ) ( ba lance +
Ut i l . getShort (
pd . getPart ( ( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) , ( short ) 0 ) ) ;
s t a t e = STATE IDLE ;
return generate ReqValAck msg (INS ACK ) ;
}
To perform a val protocol step, we first check whether the transmitted payment details are
equal to the local copy (pd.equals(...)). If they are, we increment the balance by the amount given
by the payment details and set the state to IDLE. In the end, we generate an acknowledge mes-
sage (generate ReqValAck msg(INS ACK)), which constructs a corresponding document pointer
structure). Finally, we return the ACK message which will be sent to the other card at the end
of the step method described above.
4.2 Properties
The implementation described in this Section makes extensive use of pointer structures to represent
the messages sent between the cards and to implement the state of the cards. The idea here is
to implement the document data type of the security protocol very closely. When verifying such
an implementation (the refinement proof for this implementation is current work in progress),
we discovered that it is crucial to have good verification support for pointer structures. Some
results for the verification technique for programs using complex pointer structues can be found
in [SGR06].
For the Mondex example we use an invariant for the Purse class, which describes that the
corresponding pointer structure is wellformed. Since memory allocation on smart cards cannot
be done at runtime (there is no garbage collection and the memory is very limited), we have to
allocate every piece of memory that is needed already inside the constructor of the purse. This
also means that all document messages that will be sent by the card have to be pre-allocated at
instance creation time. The same is true for the payment details field, the exception log and every
other field of the purse.
This leads to an invariant that describes for every field which pointer structure is stored within
the field. An example is given below for the payment details field pd of class Purse. This example
uses the notation and predicates of the Java Calculus in KIV described in [Ste04] [Ste05] [SGR06].
is-pd-ref(r,st) ↔
validrefnotnull(r, Doclist,st)
∧ validrefnotnull(st[r – .docs].refval, mkarraytype(Document),st)
∧ st[r.docs.length] = 5
∧ st[r.docs.type] = mkarraytype(Document)
∧ validrefnotnull(st[r.docs[0]], IntDoc, st)
∧ validrefnotnull(st[r.docs[1]], IntDoc, st)
∧ validrefnotnull(st[r.docs[2]], IntDoc, st)
∧ validrefnotnull(st[r.docs[3]], IntDoc, st)






Predicate is-pd-ref(r,st) describes when a pointer structure starting at reference r is a valid
representation of payment details in Java store st. The reference itself has to have type Doclist
and must not be null (validrefnotnull(r, Doclist,st)). The docs field of this Doclist has to be of
the right type (array of Document) and its length must be five (since payment details have five
slots). Every payment detail entry must be of type IntDoc (given by validrefnotnull(st[r.docs[i]],
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We presented three implementations for the Mondex case study.
Two of them are based on APDU communication with byte arrays. Both implementations try
to implement the communication protocol specification level (see Fig. 1.1) as close as possible. The
communication protocol level (the concrete level of [SCW00] or [SGHR06]) does not contain any
cryptography in the specification yet. Both implementations have to add cryptography to ensure
security of the protocol. One of them is using symmetric cryptography, the other one is using
asymmetric cryptography. The use of asymmetric cryptography has some security advantages (if
one card is hacked physically, this does not lead to the possibiliy of an attack against all other
cards), but also requires a more complicated protocol because of limited APDU lengths.
We also show a way to implement the Mondex case study using specialized security protocol
data types and symmetric cryptography. This implementation is based on the security protocol
level which already introduces cryptography and is shown to be a refinement of the communication
protocol level in [HSGR06]. The direct transformation of the datatypes of this specification level
into Java classes makes a refinement proof for the Java code possible. This is current work in




cryptography using byte arrays
/∗
∗ Copyright (C) 2006 Holger Grandy , Department o f Sof tware
∗ Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f Augsburg , Germany This program
∗ i s f r e e so f tware ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
∗ i t under the terms o f the GNU General Pub l i c License as
∗ pub l i s h ed by the Free Sof tware Foundation ; e i t h e r ve r s i on
∗ 2 o f the License , or ( at your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
∗ This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope t ha t i t w i l l be
∗ use fu l , but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the
∗ imp l i ed warranty o f MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
∗ PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Pub l i c License
∗ f o r more d e t a i l s . You shou ld have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the
∗ GNU General Pub l i c License a long wi th t h i s program ; i f
∗ not , wr i t e to the Free Sof tware Foundation , Inc . , 51
∗ Frank l in S t ree t , F i f t h Floor , Boston , MA 02110−1301 , USA
∗/
/∗
∗ Mondex E l e c t r on i c Purse Implementation us ing symmetric
∗ cryptography and pre shared keys Author : Holger Grandy ,
∗ Department o f Sof tware Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f
∗ Augsburg , Germany This i s an example implemenation f o r
∗ the Mondex e l e c t r o n i c purse scenar io . This implementat ion
∗ i s a case s tudy f o r research and f o r academic purposes
∗ only . I t has noth ing to do wi th the r e a l implementat ion
∗ o f Mondex E l e c t r on i c Purses owned by Mastercard
∗ I n t e r na t i o na l . There i s a b s o l u t e l y no r e l a t i o n s h i p
∗ between the authors o f t h i s source code and Nat iona l
∗ Westminster Bank , Mastercard I n t e r na t i o na l or any o ther
∗ i n s t i t u t i o n in vo l v ed in the Mondex Smart Cards . The
∗ under l y ing s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s implementat ion can be
∗ found at
∗ h t t p ://www. in fo rmat i k . uni−augsburg . de/ swt / p r o j e c t s /mondex . html
∗ in Pro jec t ”Mondex ASM Refinement − improved ve r s i on ”
∗/
package mondex ;
import javacard . framework .APDU;
import javacard . framework . Applet ;
import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
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import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y .DESKey ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
public class Purse extends Applet {
// i n s t r u c t i o n s
private stat ic f ina l byte SF = (byte ) 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ST = (byte ) 6 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte REQ = (byte ) 12 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte VAL = (byte ) 14 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ACK = (byte ) 16 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte GNS = (byte ) 18 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte GEL = (byte ) 20 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte DEL = (byte ) 22 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INIT = (byte ) 24 ;
// s t a t e s
private stat ic f ina l byte IDLE = (byte ) 1 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPR = (byte ) 5 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPV = (byte ) 6 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPA = (byte ) 7 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPI = (byte ) 8 ;
// pd i n d i z e s
private stat ic f ina l byte index fromname = (byte ) 4 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index toname = (byte ) 12 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index fromseqno = (byte ) 0 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte i ndex toseqno = (byte ) 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index amount = (byte ) 20 ;
private Cipher c iphe r ;
// my pro t o co l f i e l d s
private short balance ;
private byte [ ] name ;
private short seqNo ;
private byte s t a t e ;
// pay d e t a i l s and excep t i on l o g
private byte [ ] currentPD ;
private byte [ ] ex log ;
private short currentExLogIndex ;
// keys and s i gna t u r e s
private byte [ ] sharedkey ;
private byte [ ] bankkey ;
private DESKey sharedkeyobj ;
private DESKey bankkeyobject ;
/∗∗
∗ Constructor , i n i t i a l i z e f i e l d s and cryp tog raph i c keys
∗/
public Purse ( ) {
currentPD = new byte [ 8 /∗ name ∗/+ 8 /∗ o ther name ∗/
+ 2 /∗ seqno ∗/+ 2 /∗ o ther seqno ∗/
+ 2 /∗ amount ∗/
] ;
// suppor t 5 excep t i on l o g e n t r i e s
ex log = new byte [ ( short ) (5 ∗ currentPD . l ength ) ] ;
currentExLogIndex = 0 ;
// symmetric 3DES se s s i on key f o r communication wi th
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// o ther cards
// va lue w i l l be s e t in i n i t phase
sharedkey = new byte [ 2 4 ] ;
// symmetric 3DES banking key , used only f o r a r ch i v i n g
// and d e l e t i n g
// excep t i on logs , va lue w i l l be s e t in i n i t phase
bankkey = new byte [ 2 4 ] ;
// s e s s i on key ob j e c t , va lue w i l l be s e t in i n i t phase
sharedkeyobj = (DESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE DES, KeyBuilder .LENGTH DES3 3KEY,
true ) ;
// banking key ob j e c t , va lue w i l l be s e t in i n i t phase
bankkeyobject = (DESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE DES, KeyBuilder .LENGTH DES3 3KEY,
true ) ;
// curren t s t a t e
s t a t e = EPI ;
// name w i l l be s e t in INIT phase
name = new byte [ 8 ] ;
// i n i t i a l ba lance w i l l be s e t in INIT phase
balance = 0 ;
c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG DES CBC NOPAD,
true ) ;
r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ c r ea t e a new ins tance o f t h i s purse
∗/
public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte [ ] b , short i , byte b0 ) {
new Purse ( ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ not ing to do when s e l e c t i n g t h i s a pp l e t
∗/




∗ main case d i s t i n c t i o n , checks input / s t a t e and
∗ corresponding p ro t o co l s t ep func t i on
∗/
public void proce s s (APDU arg0 ) throws ISOException {
JCSystem . beg inTransact ion ( ) ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
byte i n s = bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] ;
i f ( i n s == ISO7816 . INS SELECT)
return ;
else i f ( s t a t e == EPI && in s == INIT)
s e tF i e l d s ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == IDLE && in s == GNS)
getNameSeqNoBal ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == IDLE && in s == GEL)
getExlog ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == IDLE && in s == DEL
&& checkExlog ( arg0 ) )
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delExlog ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == IDLE && in s == SF
&& checkStartFrom ( arg0 ) )
startFrom ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == IDLE && in s == ST
&& checkStartTo ( arg0 ) )
startTo ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == EPR && in s == REQ
&& checkStep ( arg0 , REQ) )
req ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == EPV && in s == VAL
&& checkStep ( arg0 , VAL) )
va l ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( s t a t e == EPA && in s == ACK
&& checkStep ( arg0 , ACK))
ack ( arg0 ) ;
else {
abort ( ) ;
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
ISOException . throwIt ( ISO7816 .SWCOMMANDNOTALLOWED) ;
}
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// p e r s ona l i z e card
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
/∗∗
∗ s e t s i n t e r n a l f i e l d s ( both keys , name , ba lance ) , on ly
∗ c a l l e d once a f t e r i n i t i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a pp l e t t h i s
∗ must happen in a secured environment at the bank
∗ b e f o r e the customer g e t s the card
∗/
private void s e tF i e l d s (APDU arg0 ) {
short l = arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
i f ( l != 58)
return ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// s e t banking key
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, bankkey ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 4 ) ;
bankkeyobject . setKey ( bankkey , ( short ) 0 ) ;
// s e t shared card key
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 24) , sharedkey ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 4 ) ;
sharedkeyobj . setKey ( sharedkey , ( short ) 0 ) ;
// s e t own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 24 + 24) , name ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// s e t i n i t i a l ba lance
balance = Ut i l . getShort ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 24 + 24 + 8 ) ) ;
// i n i t s t a t e




// check methods f o r input / s t a t e
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
/∗∗
∗ check method f o r input / s t a t e when r e c e i v i n g
∗ req / va l /ack
∗/
private boolean checkStep (APDU arg0 , byte i n s ) {
short l = arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
i f ( l != ( short ) 24)
return fa lse ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
decrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 2 4 ) ;
// encrypted i n s t r u c t i o n has to be ok , pay d e t a i l s must
// match
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA] != in s
| | Ut i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) , currentPD ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) != 0)




∗ check method , c a l l e d when r e c e i v i n g s tar tTo
∗/
private boolean checkStartTo (APDU arg0 ) {
short l = arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
i f ( l != ( short ) 16)
return fa lse ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// check seq no
i f ( seqNo == 32767)
return fa lse ;
decrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 1 6 ) ;
// check i n s t r u c t i o n
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA] != ST)
return fa lse ;
// check o ther name != own name
i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2) , name ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) name . l ength ) == ( short ) 0)
return fa lse ;
// check e x l o g not f u l l
i f ( currentExLogIndex == ex log . l ength )
return fa lse ;
// check p o s i t i v e amount
i f ( ( short ) ( Ut i l . getShort ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2 + 8) ) ) <= ( short ) 0)
return fa lse ;
// check ove r f l ow
i f ( ( short ) ( Ut i l . getShort ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2 + 8)) + balance ) <= ( short ) 0)





∗ check method , c a l l e d when r e c e i v i n g startFrom
∗/
private boolean checkStartFrom (APDU arg0 ) {
short l = arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
i f ( l != 12)
return fa lse ;
// check seq no
i f ( seqNo == 32767)
return fa lse ;
// check o ther name != own name
i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 2) , name ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) name . l ength ) == ( short ) 0)
return fa lse ;
// check e x l o g not f u l l
i f ( currentExLogIndex == ex log . l ength )
return fa lse ;
// check p o s i t i v e amount
i f ( ( short ) ( Ut i l . getShort ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2 + 8) ) ) <= ( short ) 0)
return fa lse ;
// check under f low
i f ( ( short ) ( Ut i l
. getShort ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA
+ ( short ) 2 + ( short ) 8 ) ) ) > balance )




∗ check method , c a l l e d when r e c e i v i n g a ” d e l e t e e x l o g ”
∗ message
∗ inpu t : DEL + Enc [ Bank ] (DEL + ex l o g )
∗ output : ok
∗/
private boolean checkExlog (APDU arg0 ) {
arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
decrypt ( bankkeyobject , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 112 ) ;
// check i n s t r u c t i o n
i f ( bu f f e r [ ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA) ] != DEL)
return fa lse ;
// decryp ted e x l o g must match
i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) , exlog ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) ex log . l ength ) != 0)








∗ r e s e t s s t a t e and l o g s curren t pay d e t a i l s i f in EPA
∗ or EPV
∗/
private void abort ( ) {
l og I fNeeded ( ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
/∗∗
∗ l o g s curren t pay d e t a i l s i f in EPA or EPV
∗/
private void l og I fNeeded ( ) {
i f ( s t a t e == EPV | | s t a t e == EPA) {
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , exlog ,
currentExLogIndex , ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;




// a r ch i v i n g s t u f f
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
/∗∗
∗ getExLog p ro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t : GEL
∗ output : Enc [ Bank ] ( name + ex l o g )
∗/
private void getExlog (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) name . l ength ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( exlog , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r , ( short ) 8 ,
( short ) ex log . l ength ) ;
short l en = encrypt ( bankkeyobject , bu f f e r , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) ( ex log . l ength + name . l ength ) ) ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , l en ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ d e l e t e e x l o g e n t r i e s and r e s e t counter
∗/
private void delExlog (APDU arg0 ) {
for ( short i = 0 ; i < ( short ) ex log . l ength ; i++)
ex log [ i ] = 0 ;
currentExLogIndex = 0 ;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// p ro t o co l s t e p s from here
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
/∗∗
∗ ack p ro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t : ACK + Enc [ SharedKey ] (ACK + Payde t a i l s )
∗ output : ok
∗/
private void ack (APDU arg0 ) {




∗ va l p r o t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t : VAL + Enc [ SharedKey ] (VAL + Payde t a i l s )
∗ output : ACK + Enc [ SharedKey ] (ACK + Payde t a i l s )
∗/
private void va l (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// increment ba lance
balance = ( short ) ( ba lance + Ut i l . getShort ( currentPD ,
index amount ) ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r o ther card
// we can use curren t input bu f f e r , v a l u e s shou ld be
// r i g h t a l r eady
// excep t encryp t ion / i n s t r u c t i o n by t e
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ACK;
bu f f e r [ 5 ] = ACK;
encrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) ( currentPD . l ength + 1 ) ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 9 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ req p ro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t : REQ + Enc [ SharedKey ] (REQ + Payde t a i l s )
∗ output : VAL + Enc [ SharedKey ] (VAL + Payde t a i l s )
∗/
private void req (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
ba lance = ( short ) ( ba lance − Ut i l . getShort ( currentPD ,
index amount ) ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r o ther card
// we can use curren t input bu f f e r , v a l u e s shou ld be
// r i g h t a l r eady
// excep t encryp t ion / i n s t r u c t i o n by t e
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = VAL;
bu f f e r [ 5 ] = VAL;
encrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) ( currentPD . l ength + 1 ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 24 ) ] = (byte ) 30 ;
s t a t e = EPA;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 3 0 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ s tar tTo p ro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t :
∗ STARTTO + Enc [ SharedKey ] (STARTTO
∗ + seqno o ther + name other + amount )
∗ output :
∗ REQ + Enc [ SharedKey ] (REQ + Payde t a i l s )
∗/
private void startTo (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy o ther seq no
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) , currentPD ,
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index fromseqno , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy o ther name
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + ( short ) 2 ) ,
currentPD , index fromname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// copy amount
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA
+ 1 + ( short ) 2 + ( short ) 8 ) , currentPD ,
index amount , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// s e t own seqno
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( currentPD , index toseqno , seqNo ) ;
// s e t own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , currentPD ,
index toname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r o ther card
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ;
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = REQ;
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 24 ;
bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA] = REQ;
// copy p a y d e t a i l s
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) ,
( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
encrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) ( currentPD . l ength + 1 ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 24 ) ] = (byte ) 30 ;
s t a t e = EPV;
seqNo += ( short ) 1 ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 3 0 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ startFrom pro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t :
∗ STARTFROM + seqno o ther + name other + amount
∗ output :
∗ STARTTO + Enc [ SharedKey ] (STARTFRom +
∗ seqno + name + amount )
∗/
private void startFrom (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy o ther seq no
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA ) ,
currentPD , index toseqno , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy o ther name
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 2 ) ,
currentPD , index toname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// copy amount
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA
+ ( short ) 2 + ( short ) 8 ) , currentPD , index amount ,
( short ) 2 ) ;
// s e t own seqno
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( currentPD , index fromseqno , seqNo ) ;
// s e t own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , currentPD ,
index fromname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r o ther card
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bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ;
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ST;
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 16 ;
bu f f e r [ 5 ] = ST;
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1) , seqNo ) ;
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2) ,
( short ) name . l ength ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index amount , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 1 + 2 + 8) ,
( short ) 2 ) ;
encrypt ( sharedkeyobj , bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 1 3 ) ;
bu f f e r [ ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 16 ) ] = (byte ) 30 ;
// increment seq no
seqNo += ( short ) 1 ;
s t a t e = EPR;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 2 ) ;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// query messages from here
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
/∗∗
∗ getNameSeqNoBalance p ro t o co l s t ep
∗ inpu t : GNS
∗ output : seqno + name + ba lance
∗/
private void getNameSeqNoBal (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy my seq no
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA) ,
seqNo ) ;
// copy my name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 2) ,
( short ) name . l ength ) ;
// copy my ba lance
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + 2 + name . l ength ) ,
ba lance ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,






∗ encrypt b u f f e r beg inn ing at index encryp t i onbeg in
∗ with l en g t h l en wi th Key k , s t o r e r e s u l t in p l ace
∗/
private short encrypt (DESKey k , byte [ ] bu f f e r ,
short encrypt ionbeg in , short data len ) {
short i = data len ;
i f ( data len % 8 != 0)
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i = ( short ) ( data len − ( data len % 8) + 8 ) ;
for ( short j = data len ; j < i ; j++) {
bu f f e r [ ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + j ) ] = (byte ) 0 ;
}
c iphe r . i n i t (k , Cipher .MODEENCRYPT) ;
c iphe r . doFinal ( bu f f e r , encrypt ionbeg in , i , bu f f e r ,




∗ decryp t b u f f e r beg inn ing at index beg in wi th l e n g t h
∗ l en wi th Key k , s t o r e r e s u l t in p l ace
∗/
private void decrypt (DESKey k , byte [ ] bu f f e r ,
short begin , short l en ) {
c iphe r . i n i t (k , Cipher .MODEDECRYPT) ;






cryptography using byte arrays
/∗
∗ Copyright (C) 2006 Nina Moebius , Department o f Sof tware
∗ Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f Augsburg , Germany This program
∗ i s f r e e so f tware ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
∗ i t under the terms o f the GNU General Pub l i c License as
∗ pub l i s h ed by the Free Sof tware Foundation ; e i t h e r ve r s i on
∗ 2 o f the License , or ( at your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
∗ This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope t ha t i t w i l l be
∗ use fu l , but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the
∗ imp l i ed warranty o f MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
∗ PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Pub l i c License
∗ f o r more d e t a i l s . You shou ld have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the
∗ GNU General Pub l i c License a long wi th t h i s program ; i f
∗ not , wr i t e to the Free Sof tware Foundation , Inc . , 51
∗ Frank l in S t ree t , F i f t h Floor , Boston , MA 02110−1301 , USA
∗/
/∗
∗ Mondex E l e c t r on i c Purse Implementation us ing asymmetric
∗ cryptography Author : Nina Moebius , Department o f Sof tware
∗ Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f Augsburg , Germany This i s an
∗ example implemenation f o r the Mondex e l e c t r o n i c purse
∗ scenar io . This implementat ion i s a case s tudy f o r
∗ re search and f o r academic purposes on ly . I t has noth ing
∗ to do wi th the r e a l implementat ion o f Mondex E l e c t r on i c
∗ Purses owned by Mastercard I n t e r na t i o na l . There i s
∗ a b s o l u t e l y no r e l a t i o n s h i p between the authors o f t h i s
∗ source code any Nat iona l Westminster Bank , Mastercard
∗ I n t e r na t i o na l or any o ther i n s t i t u t i o n in vo l v ed in the
∗ Mondex Smart Cards . The under l y ing s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s
∗ implementat ion can be found at
∗ h t t p ://www. in fo rmat i k . uni−augsburg . de/ swt / p r o j e c t s /mondex . html
∗ in Pro jec t ”Mondex ASM Refinement − improved ve r s i on ”
∗/
package mondex ;
import javacard . framework .APDU;
import javacard . framework . Applet ;
import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
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import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
// Mondex Implementation us ing asymmetric cryptography
public class Purse extends Applet {
// i n s t r u c t i o n s
private stat ic f ina l byte SF1 = (byte ) 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte SF2 = (byte ) 4 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ST1 = (byte ) 6 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte CONTINUE ST1 = (byte ) 22 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte CONTINUE ST2 = (byte ) 24 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ST2 = (byte ) 8 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ST3 = (byte ) 10 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte REQ = (byte ) 12 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte VAL = (byte ) 14 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ACK = (byte ) 16 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte GNS = (byte ) 18 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte GSI = (byte ) 20 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte ARCHIVE = (byte ) 26 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte DELLOG = (byte ) 30 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte BAL = (byte ) 28 ;
// s t a t e s
private stat ic f ina l byte IDLE = (byte ) 1 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPSF2 = (byte ) 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPST2 = (byte ) 3 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPST3 = (byte ) 4 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPR = (byte ) 5 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPV = (byte ) 6 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPA = (byte ) 7 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPCST1 = (byte ) 8 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte EPCST2 = (byte ) 9 ;
// s t a t e + i n s t r u c t i o n over loaded
private stat ic f ina l byte INIT1 = (byte ) 91 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INIT2 = (byte ) 92 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INIT3 = (byte ) 93 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INIT4 = (byte ) 94 ;
// pd i n d i z e s
private stat ic f ina l byte index fromname = (byte ) 8 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index toname = (byte ) 0 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index fromseqno = (byte ) 18 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte i ndex toseqno = (byte ) 16 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte index amount = (byte ) 20 ;
// my pro t o co l f i e l d s
private short balance ;
private byte [ ] name ;
private short seqNo ;
private byte s t a t e ;
// pay d e t a i l s and excep t i on l o g
private byte [ ] currentPD ;
private byte [ ] ex log ;
private short exlogCounter ;
// my keys and s i gna t u r e s
private byte [ ] mypubkey ;
private byte [ ] myprivkey ;
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private byte [ ] mypubexp ;
private RSAPublicKey myrsapub ;
private RSAPrivateKey myrsapriv ;
private RSAPublicKey otherrsapub ;
private byte [ ] othermodulus ;
private byte [ ] mysignature ;
private RSAPublicKey bankkey ;
private Signature s i gn ;
// cons tant p u b l i c bank key
private stat ic f ina l byte [ ] bankmodulus = new byte [ ] {
(byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xE7 ,
(byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xFD,
(byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x43 ,
(byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0x40 ,
(byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xBD, (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0x3B ,
(byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xF7 ,
(byte ) 0x9B , (byte ) 0x8B , (byte ) 0xF4 , (byte ) 0xA1 ,
(byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xC8 ,
(byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0xE7 ,
(byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0xF5 , (byte ) 0xDA, (byte ) 0x7C ,
(byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xD9 , (byte ) 0x13 ,
(byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0x6D , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
(byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0xDF, (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x41 ,
(byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0xFF ,
(byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0xDD,
(byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0x2D , (byte ) 0xFA, (byte ) 0x75 ,
(byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xA0 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x5A ,
(byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x12 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x5D ,
(byte ) 0xC3 , (byte ) 0xD3 , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x0E ,
(byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0x28 ,
(byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0x93 ,
(byte ) 0xC8 , (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x3F , (byte ) 0x0C ,
(byte ) 0xE8 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x52 ,
(byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0x9F , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDF,
(byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x8B , (byte ) 0x5C ,
(byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xAD,
(byte ) 0xA4 , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xBA,
(byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xEC, (byte ) 0x46 ,
(byte ) 0xE7 , (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0x22 ,
(byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xB9 ,
(byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x6F , (byte ) 0x56 ,
(byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x9F , } ;
// one temporary array f o r s i gna tu r e checks and
// temporary data s t o rage
private byte [ ] temp ;
public Purse ( ) {
currentPD = new byte [ ( short ) 8 /∗ nameto ∗/
+ ( short ) 8 /∗ namefrom ∗/+ ( short ) 2 /∗ seqnoto ∗/
+ ( short ) 2 /∗ seqnofrom ∗/+ ( short ) 2 /∗ amount ∗/
] ;
temp = new byte [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
// suppor t 5 excep t i on l o g g i n g s
ex log = new byte [ ( short ) (5 ∗ currentPD . l ength ) ] ;
exlogCounter = 0 ;
// i n i t my f i x e d f i e l d s
balance = ( short ) 200 ;
seqNo = ( short ) 1 ;
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name = new byte [ ( short ) 8 ] ;
mypubexp = new byte [ ] { 1 , 0 , 1 } ;
mypubkey = new byte [ ( short ) 1 2 8 ] ;
myprivkey = new byte [ ( short ) 1 2 8 ] ;
mysignature = new byte [ ( short ) 1 2 8 ] ;
othermodulus = new byte [ 1 2 8 ] ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
s i gn = Signature . g e t In s tance (
S ignature .ALG RSA SHA PKCS1, true ) ;
myrsapub = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE RSA PUBLIC,
KeyBuilder . LENGTH RSA 1024 , true ) ;
myrsapriv = (RSAPrivateKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE RSA PRIVATE,
KeyBuilder . LENGTH RSA 1024 , true ) ;
otherrsapub = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE RSA PUBLIC,
KeyBuilder . LENGTH RSA 1024 , true ) ;
otherrsapub . setExponent (new byte [ ] { (byte ) 0x01 ,
(byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x01 } , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 3 ) ;
// i n i t i a l i z e bank pu b l i c key
bankkey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey (
KeyBuilder .TYPE RSA PUBLIC,
KeyBuilder . LENGTH RSA 1024 , true ) ;
bankkey . setExponent (new byte [ ] { (byte ) 0x01 ,
(byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x01 } , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 3 ) ;
bankkey . setModulus ( bankmodulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) bankmodulus . l ength ) ;
r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
}
public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte [ ] b , short i , byte b0 ) {
new Purse ( ) ;
}




// main case d i s t i n c t i o n , b a s i c a l l y c a l l s c h e c k s t a t e and
// corresponding p ro t o co l s t ep func t i on
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
public void proce s s (APDU arg0 ) throws ISOException {
JCSystem . beg inTransact ion ( ) ;
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ISO7816 . INS SELECT)
return ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == BAL
&& s t a t e == IDLE)
getBalance ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == INIT1
&& s t a t e == IDLE && checkLengthName ( arg0 ) )
setName ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == INIT2
&& s t a t e == INIT2 && checkLength ( arg0 ) )
setPubKey ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == INIT3
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&& s ta t e == INIT3 && checkLength ( arg0 ) )
setPrivKey ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == INIT4
&& s t a t e == INIT4 && checkLength ( arg0 ) )
s e tS i gna tu r e ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == GNS
&& s t a t e == IDLE)
getNameSeqNo ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == GSI
&& s t a t e == IDLE)
ge tS ig ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == SF1
&& s t a t e == IDLE && checkStartFT ( arg0 ) )
startFrom1 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == SF2
&& s t a t e == EPSF2 && checkSF2 ( arg0 ) )
startFrom2 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ST1
&& s t a t e == IDLE && checkStartFT ( arg0 ) )
startTo1 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == CONTINUE ST1
&& s t a t e == EPCST1)
continueST1 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ST2
&& s t a t e == EPST2 && checkST2 ( arg0 ) )
startTo2 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == CONTINUE ST2
&& s t a t e == EPCST2)
continueST2 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ST3
&& s t a t e == EPST3 && checkST3 ( arg0 ) )
startTo3 ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == REQ
&& s ta t e == EPR && checkStep ( arg0 , REQ) )
req ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == VAL
&& s t a t e == EPV && checkStep ( arg0 , VAL) )
va l ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ACK
&& s ta t e == EPA && checkStep ( arg0 , ACK))
ack ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ARCHIVE
&& s t a t e == IDLE)
arch ive ( arg0 ) ;
else i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == DELLOG
&& s ta t e == IDLE && checkDelLog ( arg0 ) )
delLog ( arg0 ) ;
else {
abort ( ) ;
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
ISOException . throwIt ( ISO7816 .SW DATA INVALID) ;
}
JCSystem . commitTransaction ( ) ;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// p ro t o co l s t e p s from here
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
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// input : Ack (( name To , name from , SeqNo From , SeqNo To ,
// Amount ) , S ig [To ] ( Ack , name To , name from , SeqNo From ,
// SeqNo To , Amount ) )
// output : ok
private void ack (APDU arg0 ) {
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
// input : Val ( ( name To , name from , SeqNo From , SeqNo To ,
// Amount ) , S ig [From ] ( Val , name To , name from ,
// SeqNo From , SeqNo To , Amount ) )
// output : Ack (( name To , name from , SeqNo From ,
// SeqNo To , Amount ) , S ig [To ] ( Ack , name To , name from ,
// SeqNo From , SeqNo To , Amount ) )
private void va l (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// inc rea se ba lance o f to purse
balance = ( short ) ( ( short ) ba lance + Ut i l . getShort (
currentPD , index amount ) ) ;
// send ack message
// copy currentPD to b u f f e r
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
// c rea t e s i gna tu r e and copy s i gna tu r e to b u f f e r
temp [ 0 ] = ACK;
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn
. s i gn (
temp ,
( short ) 0 ,
( short ) ( ( short ) currentPD . l ength + ( short ) 1 ) ,
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ACK; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 150 ; // l en g t h o f data :
// currentPD . l en g t h +
// s i gna tu r e . l e n g t h
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA,
( short ) 155 ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
// input : Req (( name To , name from , SeqNo From , SeqNo To ,
// Amount ) , S ig [To ] ( Req , name To , name from , SeqNo To ,
// SeqNo From , Amount ) )
// output : Val ( ( name To , name from , SeqNo From ,
// SeqNo To , Amount ) , S ig [From ] ( Val , name To , name from ,
// SeqNo To , SeqNo From , Amount ) )
private void req (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// decrement ba lance o f from purse
balance = ( short ) ( ( short ) ba lance − Ut i l . getShort (
currentPD , index amount ) ) ;
// send va l message
// copy currentPD to b u f f e r
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temp [ 0 ] = VAL;
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn
. s i gn (
temp ,
( short ) 0 ,
( short ) ( ( short ) currentPD . l ength + ( short ) 1 ) ,
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = VAL; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 150 ; // l en g t h o f data :
// currentPD . l en g t h +
// s i gna tu r e . l e n g t h
bu f f e r [ 1 5 5 ] = (byte ) 155 ; // l e (= l en g t h o f ack )
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA,
( short ) ( 1 5 6 ) ) ;
s t a t e = EPA;
}
// input : ST3( Sig [From ] ( Pubkey From , Name From ,
// SeqNo From , Amount , S ig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey From ,
// Name From) ) )
// output : Req (( name To , name from , SeqNo From ,
// SeqNo To , Amount ) , S ig [To ] ( Req , name To , name from ,
// SeqNo From , SeqNo To , Amount ) )
private void startTo3 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy p a y d e t a i l s o f to purse to output b u f f e r
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
// copy REQ, p a y d e t a i l s to temp
temp [ 0 ] = REQ;
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 1 ,
( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
// s i gn REQ, p a y d e t a i l s and copy s i gna tu r e to output
// b u f f e r
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn
. s i gn (
temp ,
( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 23 ,
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 2 2 ) ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = REQ; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 150 ; // l en g t h o f data :
// currentPD . l en g t h +
// s i gna tu r e . l e n g t h
bu f f e r [ 1 5 5 ] = (byte ) 156 ; // l e : v a l + apdu b u f f e r
arg0
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. setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA, ( short ) 156 ) ;
s t a t e = EPV;
}
// input : ST2( Sig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey From , Name From))
// output : ok
private void startTo2 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy s i gna tu r e to temp array (−> temp =
// [ pubkeyFrom , nameFrom , seqNo From , Amount ,
// Sig [ bank ] ( pubkeyFrom , nameFrom ) ] )
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, temp ,
( short ) ( ( short ) 128 + ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 5 ) ,
( short ) 128 ) ;
s t a t e = EPST3 ;
}
// input : ST1(Pubkey From , Name From , SeqNo From ,
// Amount)
// output : ok
private void startTo1 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
temp [ 0 ] = ST3 ;
// copy o ther p u b l i c key
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
othermodulus , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
otherrsapub . setModulus ( othermodulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 128 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, temp ,
( short ) 1 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
// copy o ther name to currentPD
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128) ,
currentPD , index fromname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128) , temp ,
( short ) 129 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// copy o ther seqno
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 136) ,
currentPD , index fromseqno , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 136) , temp ,
( short ) ( ( short ) 129 + ( short ) 8 ) , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy amount
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA
+ ( short ) 128 + ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 2 ) , currentPD ,
index amount , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA
+ ( short ) 128 + ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 2 ) , temp ,
( short ) ( ( short ) 129 + ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 2 ) ,
( short ) 2 ) ;
// s e t own seqno
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( currentPD , index toseqno , seqNo ) ;
// s e t own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , currentPD ,
index toname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
seqNo += 1 ;
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s t a t e = EPST2 ;
}
// input : CONTINUE ST1
// output : ST2( Sig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey From , Name From))
private void continueST1 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ST2 ; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) mysignature . l ength ; // l en g t h o f
// data
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( mysignature , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) mysignature . l ength ) ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA,
( short ) ( ( short ) 5 + ( short ) mysignature . l ength ) ) ;
s t a t e = EPCST2;
}
// input : CONTINUE ST2
// output : ST3( Sig [From ] ( Pubkey From , Name From ,
// SeqNo From , Amount , S ig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey From ,
// Name From) ) )
private void continueST2 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ; // CLA
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ST3 ; // INS
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P1
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0 ; // P2
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) 128 ; // l en g t h o f data
bu f f e r [ 5 + 128 ] = (byte ) 156 ; // l e : req + apdu
// header
// copy ST3 , my pubkey , name , SeqNo , Amount to temp
temp [ 0 ] = ST3 ;
Ut i l . arrayCopy (mypubkey , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 1 ,
( short ) 128 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , temp ,
( short ) ( ( short ) 128 + ( short ) 1 ) , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index fromseqno , temp ,
( short ) 137 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index amount , temp ,
( short ) 139 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy Signature o f From Purse to temp
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( mysignature , ( short ) 0 , temp ,
( short ) 141 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
// s i gn data o f temp array
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn . s i gn ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 269 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA) ;
// send s i gna tu r e
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA,
( short ) ( ( short ) 6 + ( short ) 1 2 8 ) ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy (mypubexp , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 3 ) ;
s t a t e = EPR;
}
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// input : SF2( Sig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey To + name To)
// output : ST1(Pubkey From , Name From , SeqNo From ,
// Amount)
private void startFrom2 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// b u i l d apdu f o r TO purse
bu f f e r [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x90 ;
bu f f e r [ 1 ] = ST1 ;
bu f f e r [ 2 ] = (byte ) 0x00 ;
bu f f e r [ 3 ] = (byte ) 0x00 ;
bu f f e r [ 4 ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) 128 + ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 2 + ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy own pu b l i c key
Ut i l . arrayCopy (mypubkey , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 128 ) ;
// copy own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128) ,
( short ) 8 ) ;
// copy own seq no
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index fromseqno , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 136) ,
( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy amount
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index amount , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128
+ ( short ) 8 + ( short ) 2 ) , ( short ) 2 ) ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CLA,
( short ) 145 ) ;
s t a t e = EPCST1;
}
// input : SF1(Pubkey To , SeqNo To , Name To , Amount)
// output : ok
private void startFrom1 (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy o ther p u b l i c key
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
othermodulus , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
otherrsapub . setModulus ( othermodulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 128 ) ;
// copy o ther name to currentPD
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128) ,
currentPD , index toname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// copy o ther seq no to currentPD
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 136) ,
currentPD , index toseqno , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// copy amount to currentPD
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 138) ,
currentPD , index amount , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// s e t own seqno
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( currentPD , index fromseqno , seqNo ) ;
// s e t own name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , currentPD ,
index fromname , ( short ) 8 ) ;
seqNo += ( short ) 1 ;
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s t a t e = EPSF2 ;
}
// arch i v e l o g f i l e
// output : ex log , name , Sig [ pr ivkeyPurse ] ( ex log , name)
private void arch ive (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy ex log , name to temp
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( exlog , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 110 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 110 ,
( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( temp , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 118 ) ;
s i gn . i n i t ( myrsapriv , S ignature .MODE SIGN) ;
s i gn . s i gn ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 118 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 1 1 8 ) ) ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) 246 ) ;
}
// d e l e t e l o g f i l e
private void delLog (APDU arg0 ) {
for ( short i = 0 ; i < ( short ) ex log . l ength ; i++) {
ex log [ i ] = 0 ;
}
exlogCounter = 0 ;
}
// abort , i . e . s e t s t a t e to IDLE and wr i t e l o g f i l e i f
// necessary
private void abort ( ) {
l o g i f n e ed ed ( ) ;
s t a t e = IDLE ;
}
// l o g i f purse i s in s t a t e EPA or EPV
private void l o g i f n e ed ed ( ) {
i f ( s t a t e == EPA | | s t a t e == EPV) {
// add curren t p a y d e t a i l s to exLog
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , exlog ,
( short ) exlogCounter , ( short ) currentPD . l ength ) ;
exlogCounter += ( short ) currentPD . l ength ;
}
}
// check i f inpu t has l e n g t h o f 128 by t e s
private boolean checkLength (APDU arg0 ) {
return ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == ( short ) 128 ) ;
}
// check i f inpu t has l e n g t h o f 8 b y t e s
private boolean checkLengthName (APDU arg0 ) {
return ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == ( short ) 0x08 ) ;
}
// check i f input , i . e startFrom2 message , has l e n g t h o f
// 128 by t e s and s i gna tu r e ok ( purse i s au t h en t i c )
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private boolean checkSF2 (APDU arg0 ) {
i f ( ! ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == 128)) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy pubkeyTo , nameTo to temp
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( othermodulus , ( short ) 0 , temp ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , index toname , temp ,
( short ) 128 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
// v e r i f y Sig [ bank ] ( pubkeyTo , nameTo)
s i gn . i n i t ( bankkey , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( ! s i gn . v e r i f y ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 136 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 128)) {




// check i f input , i . e s tar tTo2 message , has l e n g t h o f
// 128 by t e s and s i gna tu r e ok ( purse i s au t h en t i c )
private boolean checkST2 (APDU arg0 ) {
i f ( ! ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == 128)) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
s i gn . i n i t ( bankkey , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( ! s i gn . v e r i f y ( temp , ( short ) 1 , ( short ) 136 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 128)) {




// check i f input , i . e s tar tTo3 message , has l e n g t h o f
// 128 by t e s and s i gna tu r e ok
// temp = [ pubkeyFrom , nameFrom , seqNo From , Amount ,
// Sig [ bank ] ( pubkeyFrom , nameFrom ) ] )
private boolean checkST3 (APDU arg0 ) {
i f ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) != 128) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
s i gn . i n i t ( otherrsapub , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( ! s i gn . v e r i f y ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 269 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 128)) {




// check i f s tar tTo / startFrom input i s ok : nameTo !=
// nameFrom , amount > 0? , amount < ba lance ? , seqNo <
// 32767? and exLogCounter < e x l o g . l e n g t h
private boolean checkStartFT (APDU arg0 ) {
// exLog has max . number o f e n t r i e s
i f ( exlogCounter == ex log . l ength ) {
return fa lse ;
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}
// check input l e n g t h
i f ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) != ( short ) 140) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// check nameTo!=nameFrom
i f ( Ut i l
. arrayCompare (
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 128) ,
name , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8) == 0) {
return fa lse ;
}
// check amount
i f ( ! ( U t i l
. getShort (
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 138)) > ( short ) 0 ) ) {
return fa lse ;
}
// i f ToPurse : amount + ba lance < 32767 ?
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == ST1
&& ( short ) ( ( short ) Ut i l
. getShort (
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 138))
+ ( short ) ba lance ) <= ( short ) 0) {
return fa lse ;
}
// i f FromPurse : amount < ba lance ?
i f ( bu f f e r [ ISO7816 .OFFSET INS ] == SF1
&& Ut i l
. getShort (
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 138)) > balance ) {
return fa lse ;
}
// check seqNo
i f ( seqNo == ( short ) 32767) {




// check i f inpu t data has co r r e c t l eng th , p a y d e t a i l s ok
// and Signature ok
private boolean checkStep (APDU arg0 , byte i n s ) {
i f ( ! ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == 150)) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// compare r e c e i v ed p a y d e t a i l s wi th curren t
// p a y d e t a i l s
i f ( ! ( U t i l . arrayCompare ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
currentPD , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 22) == 0)) {
return fa lse ;
}
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// copy INS , currentPD to temp
temp [ 0 ] = in s ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( currentPD , ( short ) 0 , temp , ( short ) 1 ,
( short ) 2 2 ) ;
// v e r i f y s i gna tu r e Sig [ o therpurse ] ( INS , currentPD )
s i gn . i n i t ( otherrsapub , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( ! s i gn
. v e r i f y (
temp ,
( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 23 ,
bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + ( short ) 22) ,
( short ) 128)) {




// check i f inpu t has l e n g t h o f 128 by t e s and s i gna tu r e
// ok
private boolean checkDelLog (APDU arg0 ) {
i f ( ! ( arg0 . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) == ( short ) 128)) {
return fa lse ;
}
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
s i gn . i n i t ( bankkey , S ignature .MODE VERIFY) ;
i f ( s i gn . v e r i f y ( exlog , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 110 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 128)) {





// query messages from here
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// input : g e t s i g
// output : S ig [ Bank ] ( PubKey To , Name To)
private void ge tS ig (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( mysignature , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) mysignature . l ength ) ;
arg0 . setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
( short ) mysignature . l ength ) ;
}
// input : getNameSeqNo
// output : ( Pubkey To , Name To , SeqNo To )
private void getNameSeqNo (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
// copy my pub key
Ut i l . arrayCopy (mypubkey , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) mypubkey . l ength ) ;
// copy my name
Ut i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , bu f f e r ,
( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA + mypubkey . l ength ) ,
( short ) name . l ength ) ;
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// copy my seq no
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA




( short ) (mypubkey . l ength + name . l ength + ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
}
// input : ge tBa lance
// output : Balance
private void getBalance (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . s e tShor t ( bu f f e r , ( short ) ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA) ,
balance ) ;
arg0
. setOutgoingAndSend ( ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, ( short ) 2 ) ;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// i n i t i a l i z a t i o n s t e p s from here
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// input : setName (name)
// output : ok
private void setName (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, name ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) name . l ength ) ;
s t a t e = INIT2 ;
}
// input : setPubKey (PubKey Purse )
// output : ok
private void setPubKey (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, mypubkey ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) mypubkey . l ength ) ;
myrsapub . setExponent (mypubexp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 3 ) ;
myrsapub . setModulus (mypubkey , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
s t a t e = INIT3 ;
}
// input : setPrivKey ( PrivKey Purse )
// output : ok
private void setPrivKey (APDU arg0 ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA, myprivkey ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) myprivkey . l ength ) ;
myrsapriv
. setExponent ( myprivkey , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
myrsapriv . setModulus (mypubkey , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 128 ) ;
s t a t e = INIT4 ;
}
// input : s e t S i gna tu r e ( Sig [ Bank ] ( Pubkey Purse ,
// Name Purse ) )
// output : ok
private void s e tS i gna tu r e (APDU arg0 ) {
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byte [ ] b u f f e r = arg0 . g e tBu f f e r ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( bu f f e r , ISO7816 .OFFSET CDATA,
mysignature , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) mysignature . l ength ) ;







Please note: This is only the implementation of the Purse itself. The transformation classes for
encoding of Document instances to APDUs and vice versa are not contained here. They can be
downloaded from our website [KIVa].
/∗
∗ Copyright (C) 2006 Holger Grandy , Department o f Sof tware
∗ Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f Augsburg , Germany This program
∗ i s f r e e so f tware ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
∗ i t under the terms o f the GNU General Pub l i c License as
∗ pub l i s h ed by the Free Sof tware Foundation ; e i t h e r ve r s i on
∗ 2 o f the License , or ( at your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
∗ This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope t ha t i t w i l l be
∗ use fu l , but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the
∗ imp l i ed warranty o f MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
∗ PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Pub l i c License
∗ f o r more d e t a i l s . You shou ld have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the
∗ GNU General Pub l i c License a long wi th t h i s program ; i f
∗ not , wr i t e to the Free Sof tware Foundation , Inc . , 51
∗ Frank l in S t ree t , F i f t h Floor , Boston , MA 02110−1301 , USA
∗/
/∗
∗ Mondex E l e c t r on i c Purse Implementation us ing symmetric
∗ cryptography and pre shared keys Author : Holger Grandy ,
∗ Department o f Sof tware Engineering , Un i v e r s i t y o f
∗ Augsburg , Germany This i s an example implemenation f o r
∗ the Mondex e l e c t r o n i c purse scenar io . This implementat ion
∗ i s a case s tudy f o r research and f o r academic purposes
∗ only . I t has noth ing to do wi th the r e a l implementat ion
∗ o f Mondex E l e c t r on i c Purses owned by Mastercard
∗ I n t e r na t i o na l . There i s a b s o l u t e l y no r e l a t i o n s h i p
∗ between the authors o f t h i s source code and Nat iona l
∗ Westminster Bank , Mastercard I n t e r na t i o na l or any o ther
∗ i n s t i t u t i o n in vo l v ed in the Mondex Smart Cards . The
∗ under l y ing s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s implementat ion can be
∗ found at
∗ h t t p ://www. in fo rmat i k . uni−augsburg . de/ swt / p r o j e c t s /mondex . html





import javacard . framework . ∗ ;
public class Purse implements TransformAppl icat ion {
// p r i v a t e s t a t i c Purse t h e i n s t ance ;
// p r i v a t e s t a t i c SimpleComm initcomm ;
// p r i v a t e s t a t i c Document i n i t d a t a ;
// CONSTANTS
private stat ic f ina l byte STATE IDLE = 1 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte STATE EPR = 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte STATE EPV = 3 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte STATE EPA = 4 ;
// INSBYTES
private stat ic f ina l byte INS START FROM = 1 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS START TO = 2 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS REQ = 3 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS VAL = 4 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS ACK = 5 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS GET BAL = 6 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS GET DATA = 7 ;
private stat ic f ina l byte INS GET STATE = 8 ;
// FIELDS OF PURSE
private byte [ ] name ;
private short sequenceNo ;
private short balance ;
private byte s t a t e ;
private short exLogCounter ;
private Doc l i s t [ ] exLog ;
// MESSAGES
private Doc l i s t pd ;
private Doc l i s t reqvalack msg ;
private Doc l i s t s ta r t to msg ;
private Doc l i s t getdata msg ;
private EncDoc enc msg ;




private SessionKey key ;
/∗∗
∗ cons t ruc tor , i n i t f i e l d s and messages
∗/
public Purse (SimpleComm initcomm , Document i n i t d a t a ) {
// check i n i t d a t a :
// document must be o f type :
// d o c l i s t ( intdoc1 , intdoc2 , in tdoc3 )
// in tdoc1 must have 8 d i g i t s ( thename )
// in tdoc2 must have 2 d i g i t s ( i n i t b a l )
// in tdoc3 must have 2 d i g i t s ( l o g l e n )
Document thename = in i t d a t a . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) ;
Document i n i t b a l = i n i t d a t a . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ;
Document l o g l e n = in i t d a t a . getPart ( ( short ) 3 ) ;
i f ( ! ( thename != null && thename . i s i n t d o c ( )
&& thename . getValue ( ) . l ength == 8
&& i n i t b a l != null && i n i t b a l . i s i n t d o c ( )
&& i n i t b a l . getValue ( ) . l ength == 2 && log l e n != null
&& log l e n . i s i n t d o c ( ) && l o g l e n . getValue ( ) . l ength == 2))
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return ;
short t h e l o g l e n = Ut i l . getShort ( l o g l e n . getValue ( ) ,
( short ) 0 ) ;
short theba lance = Ut i l . getShort ( i n i t b a l . getValue ( ) ,
( short ) 0 ) ;
i f ( t h e l o g l e n <= 0 | | theba lance <= 0)
return ;
// i n i t a l l f i e l d s
in itExLog ( th e l o g l e n ) ;
i n i tP a yd e t a i l s ( ) ;
i n i t S imp l eF i e l d s ( ) ;
i n i tSe s s i onKey ( ) ;
in itOutMessages ( ) ;
// save name , ba lance and comminterface
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( thename . getValue ( ) , ( short ) 0 , name ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
ba lance = theba lance ;
comm = initcomm ;
}
/∗∗
∗ i n i t f i e l d s f o r e x l o g
∗
∗ @param len
∗ l e n g t h o f e x l o g
∗/
private void in itExLog ( short l en ) {
exLog = new Doc l i s t [ l en ] ;
exLogCounter = ( short ) 0 ;
}
/∗∗
∗ i n i t p a y d e t a i l s f i e l d
∗/
private void i n i tP a yd e t a i l s ( ) {
pd = new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) , new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) , new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) } ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ i n i t s imp le f i e l d s ( shor t s , b y t e s )
∗/
private void i n i t S imp l eF i e l d s ( ) {
sequenceNo = ( short ) 0 ;
s t a t e = STATE IDLE ;
name = new byte [ 8 ] ;
}
/∗∗
∗ i n i t s e s s i onkey
∗/
private void i n i tSe s s i onKey ( ) {
key = new SessionKey (new byte [ ] { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,




∗ i n i t a l l messages used f o r communication
∗/
private void in i tOutMessages ( ) {
s ta r t to msg = new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) }) } ) ;
reqvalack msg = new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ,
new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) }) } ) ;
ba l s ta te msg = new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) ;
getdata msg = new Doc l i s t (new Document [ ] {
new IntDoc (new byte [ 8 ] ) , new IntDoc (new byte [ 2 ] ) } ) ;
enc msg = new EncDoc(new byte [ 5 6 ] ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Set p a y d e t a i l s
∗
∗ @param fromPurse
∗ fromPurse i n vo l v ed in t r a n s f e r
∗ @param nextSeqNoFromPurse
∗ seqno o f fromPurse
∗ @param toPurse
∗ toPurse i n vo l v ed in t r a n s f e r
∗ @param nextSeqNoToPurse
∗ seqno o f toPurse
∗ @param va lue
∗ va lue to t r a n s f e r
∗/
private void mkpd(byte [ ] fromPurse ,
short nextSeqNoFromPurse , byte [ ] toPurse ,
short nextSeqNoToPurse , short value ) {
byte [ ] theva l1 = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] theva l2 = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] theva l3 = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 3 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] theva l4 = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 4 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] theva l5 = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( fromPurse , ( short ) 0 , theval1 ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . s e tShor t ( theval2 , ( short ) 0 , nextSeqNoFromPurse ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( toPurse , ( short ) 0 , theval3 , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . s e tShor t ( theval4 , ( short ) 0 , nextSeqNoToPurse ) ;
U t i l . s e tShor t ( theval5 , ( short ) 0 , va lue ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ re turn next seq no
∗/
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private short nextSeqNo ( ) {





∗ chech s t r u c t u r e o f indoc
∗
∗ @param indoc
∗ document to check
∗ @return document or n u l l
∗/
private Document checkIndoc (Document indoc ) {
i f ( indoc == null )
return null ;
// decryp t i f necessary
i f ( indoc . i s en cdo c ( ) ) {
indoc = Crypto . getCrypto ( ) . decrypt ( key , indoc ) ;
// check assures , t h a t indoc i s a co r r e c t req , va l ,
// ack or s t a r t t o message
// ( f o l l o w s from ab s t r a c t i n va r i an t )
i f ( indoc != null )
return indoc ;
return null ;
} else i f ( indoc . i s i n t d o c ( ) ) {
byte [ ] theva l = indoc . getValue ( ) ;
i f ( theva l != null && theva l . l ength == 2) {
short in sb = Ut i l . getShort ( theval , ( short ) 0 ) ;
i f ( insb >= 0) {
byte b = (byte ) insb ;
i f (b == INS GET BAL | | b == INS GET DATA





} else i f ( indoc . i s d o c l i s t ( ) ) {
Document [ ] docs = ( ( Doc l i s t ) indoc ) . getDocs ( ) ;
i f ( docs . l ength == 2) {
Document part1 = indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) ;
Document part2 = indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ;
i f ( part1 . i s i n t d o c ( ) && part2 . i s d o c l i s t ( ) ) {
byte [ ] par t1va lue = part1 . getValue ( ) ;
Document [ ] part2docs = ( ( Doc l i s t ) part2 )
. getDocs ( ) ;
i f ( part1va lue . l ength == 2 && part1va lue [ 0 ] == 0
&& part1va lue [ 1 ] == INS START FROM) {
i f ( part2docs . l ength == 3
&& part2docs [ 0 ] . i s i n t d o c ( )
&& part2docs [ 1 ] . i s i n t d o c ( )









∗ copy l o c a l p a y d e t a i l s in d
∗/
private void copyLocalPds ( ) {
byte [ ] pd1value = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] pd2value = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] pd3value = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 3 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] pd4value = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 4 ) . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] pd5value = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) ;
Document outmsg pds = reqvalack msg . getDocs ( ) [ ( short ) 1 ] ;
byte [ ] out1value = outmsg pds . getPart ( ( short ) 1)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] out2value = outmsg pds . getPart ( ( short ) 2)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] out3value = outmsg pds . getPart ( ( short ) 3)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] out4value = outmsg pds . getPart ( ( short ) 4)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] out5value = outmsg pds . getPart ( ( short ) 5)
. getValue ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( pd1value , ( short ) 0 , out1value ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( pd2value , ( short ) 0 , out2value ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( pd3value , ( short ) 0 , out3value ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( pd4value , ( short ) 0 , out4value ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( pd5value , ( short ) 0 , out5value ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ s e t the pd in the outmsg and s e t i n s b y t e
∗
∗ @param ins
∗ s e t the i n s b y t e o f outmsg to t h i s by t e
∗ @return outmsg
∗/
private Document generate ReqValAck msg (byte i n s ) {
// copy pds in outmessage
copyLocalPds ( ) ;
// s e t i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e
byte [ ] theva l = reqvalack msg . getPart ( ( short ) 1)
. getValue ( ) ;
theva l [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0 ;
theva l [ 1 ] = in s ;
// encrypt
enc msg . setEncrypted ( key , reqvalack msg ) ;
return enc msg ;
}
/∗∗




∗ s e t the i n s b y t e o f outmsg to t h i s by t e
∗ @return outmsg
∗/
private Document gene ra t e Sta r t to msg ( ) {
// ge t in format ion o f p a y d e t a i l s
byte [ ] fromname = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) . getValue ( ) ; // name
// from
byte [ ] fromseqno = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) . getValue ( ) ; // seqno
// from
byte [ ] theva lue = pd . getPart ( ( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) ; // va lue
Document s t a r t t o = sta r t to msg . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ;
byte [ ] s t a r t t o 1va l u e = s t a r t t o . getPart ( ( short ) 1)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] s t a r t t o 2va l u e = s t a r t t o . getPart ( ( short ) 2)
. getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] s t a r t t o 3va l u e = s t a r t t o . getPart ( ( short ) 3)
. getValue ( ) ;
// copy from pa y d e t a i l s to s t a r t t o msg
Ut i l . arrayCopy ( fromname , ( short ) 0 , s t a r t t o1va lue ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( thevalue , ( short ) 0 , s t a r t t o2va lue ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( fromseqno , ( short ) 0 , s t a r t t o3va lue ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
// s e t i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e
byte [ ] theva l = sta r t to msg . getPart ( ( short ) 1)
. getValue ( ) ;
theva l [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0 ;
theva l [ 1 ] = (byte ) 2 ; // s t a r t t o i n s t r u c t i o n
// encrypt
enc msg . setEncrypted ( key , s ta r t to msg ) ;
return enc msg ;
}
/∗∗
∗ ge t the i n s b y t e from a we l l formed document , i n s b y t e
∗ i s re turned only i f i n s s t r u c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e in
∗ curren t s t a t e
∗
∗ @param d
∗ we l l formed document
∗ @return i n s b y t e
∗/
private byte getInsByte (Document d) {
byte i n s = 0 ;
i f (d == null )
return i n s ;
i f (d . i s d o c l i s t ( ) )
i n s = d . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) . getValue ( ) [ 1 ] ;
else i n s = d . getValue ( ) [ 1 ] ;
i f ( ( ( i n s == INS START FROM | | i n s == INS START TO) && s t a t e == STATE IDLE)
| | ( i n s == INS REQ && s ta t e == STATE EPR)
| | ( i n s == INS VAL && s t a t e == STATE EPV)
| | ( i n s == INS ACK && s ta t e == STATE EPA))
return i n s ;
else i f ( i n s == INS GET BAL | | i n s == INS GET DATA
| | i n s == INS GET STATE)
return i n s ;
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else return (byte ) 0 ;
}
/∗∗




∗ @return t rue i f names are equa l
∗/
private Document checkName (Document dmsgna ) {
i f ( ! ( dmsgna . i s i n t d o c ( ) ) )
return null ;
byte [ ] theva l = dmsgna . getValue ( ) ;
// check as sure s t ha t msgna i s au then t i c , because an
// au th en t i c pursename must have 8 d i g i t s
// and must be p o s i t i v e .
i f ( theva l . l ength != 8)
return null ;
i f ( theva l [ 0 ] < 0)
return null ;
i f ( ! Document . comparison . equa l s ( theval , name ) )
return dmsgna ;
else return null ;
}
/∗∗
∗ check i f ba lance−va lue <0
∗
∗ @param va lue
∗ the va lue
∗ @return the va lue or −1
∗/
private short checkBalanceMinus (Document dvalue ) {
i f ( ! ( dvalue . i s i n t d o c ( ) ) )
return −1;
byte [ ] theva l = dvalue . getValue ( ) ;
i f ( ! ( theva l . l ength == ( short ) 2 ) )
return −1;
short va lu e sho r t = Ut i l . getShort ( theval , ( short ) 0 ) ;
i f ( ba lance < va lu e sho r t | | va lu e sho r t < 0)
return −1;
else return va lu e sho r t ;
}
/∗∗
∗ check i f ba lance+va lue <32767
∗
∗ @param va lue
∗ the va lue
∗ @return the va lue or −1
∗/
private short checkBalancePlus (Document dvalue ) {
i f ( ! ( dvalue . i s i n t d o c ( ) ) )
return −1;
byte [ ] theva l = dvalue . getValue ( ) ;
i f ( ! ( theva l . l ength == ( short ) 2 ) )
return −1;
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short va lu e sho r t = Ut i l . getShort ( theval , ( short ) 0 ) ;
i f ( va l u e sho r t < 0
| | ( short ) ( ba lance + va lu e sho r t ) < ( short ) 0)
return −1;
else return va lu e sho r t ;
}
/∗∗
∗ check i s seqno o f o ther purse i s in tdoc and >0
∗
∗ @param seqno
∗ seqno o f o ther purse
∗ @return seqno or −1
∗/
private short checkSeqNoOtherPurse (Document seqnoother ) {
i f ( ! ( seqnoother . i s i n t d o c ( ) ) )
return −1;
byte [ ] theseqno = seqnoother . getValue ( ) ;
i f ( ! ( theseqno . l ength == ( short ) 2 ) )
return −1;
short s eqno s = Ut i l . getShort ( theseqno , ( short ) 0 ) ;
i f ( s eqno s < 0)
return −1;










∗ check which func t i on to c a l l
∗
∗ @param indoc
∗ r e c e i v ed document ( wi th ” ins”−by t e in
∗ f i r s t document −> i n tdoc )
∗ @return Document or n u l l
∗/
public void s tep ( ) {
Document outdoc = null ;
Document indoc = null ;
// check i f t h e r e i s a document in the inbox
i f (comm. av a i l a b l e ( ) )
indoc = comm. r e c e i v e ( ) ;
else return ;
// noth ing r e c e i v ed
i f ( indoc == null )
return ;
// no memory a v a i l a b l e
i f ( exLogCounter == exLog . l ength )
return ;
indoc = checkIndoc ( indoc ) ;
switch ( get InsByte ( indoc ) ) {
case INS START FROM:
outdoc = startFrom ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
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break ;
case INS START TO:
outdoc = startTo ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
break ;
case INS REQ :
outdoc = req ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
break ;
case INS VAL :
outdoc = va l ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
break ;
case INS ACK:
ack ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
break ;
case INS GET BAL :
outdoc = getBalance ( ) ;
break ;
case INS GET DATA:
outdoc = getData ( ) ;
break ;
case INS GET STATE:
outdoc = getSta t e ( ) ;
break ;
default :
abort ( ) ;
break ;
}
// send doc i f outdoc i s s e t
i f ( outdoc != null )
comm. send ( outdoc ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ abor t method change next sequenceno , s e t s t a t e to
∗ i d l e and l o g ( i f needed ) dynamic memory a l l o c a t i o n !
∗/
private void abort ( ) {
i f ( s t a t e == STATE EPA | | s t a t e == STATE EPV) {
// save pds
Document [ ] docs = pd . getDocs ( ) ;
byte [ ] oldfromname = docs [ 0 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] o ldfromseqno = docs [ 1 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] oldtoname = docs [ 2 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] o ldtoseqno = docs [ 3 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] o ldva lue = docs [ 4 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] fromseqno = new byte [ 2 ] ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( oldfromseqno , ( short ) 0 , fromseqno ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
IntDoc fromseqnoi = new IntDoc ( fromseqno ) ;
byte [ ] toseqno = new byte [ 2 ] ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( oldtoseqno , ( short ) 0 , toseqno ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
IntDoc to s eqno i = new IntDoc ( toseqno ) ;
byte [ ] theva lue = new byte [ 2 ] ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( o ldvalue , ( short ) 0 , thevalue ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 2 ) ;
IntDoc va l u e i = new IntDoc ( theva lue ) ;
byte [ ] fromname = new byte [ 8 ] ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( oldfromname , ( short ) 0 , fromname ,
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( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
IntDoc fromnamei = new IntDoc ( fromname ) ;
byte [ ] toname = new byte [ 8 ] ;
U t i l . arrayCopy ( oldtoname , ( short ) 0 , toname ,
( short ) 0 , ( short ) 8 ) ;
IntDoc tonamei = new IntDoc ( toname ) ;
exLog [ exLogCounter++] = new Doc l i s t (
new Document [ ] { fromnamei , fromseqnoi , tonamei ,
toseqno i , v a l u e i } ) ;
}
// nextSeqNo ( ) ;
s t a t e = STATE IDLE ;
}
/∗∗
∗ s t a r t f rom method check r e c e i v ed document and save
∗ p a y d e t a i l s . Move to s t a t e EPR
∗
∗ @param indoc
∗ r e c e i v ed document
∗ @return nu l l
∗/
private Document startFrom (Document indoc ) {
// ge t indocs
Document dmsgna = checkName ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) ) ;
i f ( dmsgna == null )
return null ;
short va lu e sho r t = checkBalanceMinus ( indoc
. getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
i f ( va l u e sho r t == −1)
return null ;
short nextSeqNoToPurse = checkSeqNoOtherPurse ( indoc
. getPart ( ( short ) 3 ) ) ;
i f ( nextSeqNoToPurse == −1)
return null ;
short seqno = nextSeqNo ( ) ;
i f ( seqno < 0)
return null ;
// payde t a i l s , s t a t e
mkpd(name , seqno , dmsgna . getValue ( ) , nextSeqNoToPurse ,
va l u e sho r t ) ;
s t a t e = STATE EPR;
// genera te s t a r t t omsg
return gene ra t e Sta r t to msg ( ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ s t a r t t o method check r e c e i v ed document and save




∗ r e c e i v ed document
∗ @return req message
∗/
private Document startTo (Document indoc ) {
// ge t indocs
Document msgna = checkName ( indoc . getPart ( ( short ) 1 ) ) ;
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i f (msgna == null )
return null ;
short va lu e sho r t = checkBalancePlus ( indoc
. getPart ( ( short ) 2 ) ) ;
i f ( va l u e sho r t == −1)
return null ;
short nextSeqNoFromPurse = checkSeqNoOtherPurse ( indoc
. getPart ( ( short ) 3 ) ) ;
i f ( nextSeqNoFromPurse == −1)
return null ;
short seqno = nextSeqNo ( ) ;
i f ( seqno < 0)
return null ;
// payde t a i l s , s t a t e and outmsg
mkpd(msgna . getValue ( ) , nextSeqNoFromPurse , name , seqno ,
va l u e sho r t ) ;
s t a t e = STATE EPV;




∗ req method check r e c e i v ed document and genera te a
∗ va l−message . Change ba lance and move to s t a t e EPA
∗
∗ @param indoc
∗ r e c e i v ed document
∗ @return va l message
∗/
private Document req (Document indoc ) {
i f ( ! pd . equa l s ( indoc ) )
return null ;
ba lance = ( short ) ( ba lance − Ut i l . getShort (pd . getPart (
( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) , ( short ) 0 ) ) ;
s t a t e = STATE EPA;
return generate ReqValAck msg (INS VAL ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ va l method check r e c e i v ed document and change
∗ ba lance . Move to s t a t e IDLE.
∗
∗ @param indoc
∗ r e c e i v ed document
∗ @return ack message
∗/
private Document va l (Document indoc ) {
i f ( ! pd . equa l s ( indoc ) )
return null ;
ba lance = ( short ) ( ba lance + Ut i l . getShort (pd . getPart (
( short ) 5 ) . getValue ( ) , ( short ) 0 ) ) ;
s t a t e = STATE IDLE ;







∗ r e c e i v ed document
∗ @return nu l l
∗/
private void ack (Document indoc ) {
i f ( ! pd . equa l s ( indoc ) )
return ;
s t a t e = STATE IDLE ;
}
/∗∗
∗ re turn the a c t ua l s t a t e o f the purse
∗
∗ @return s t a t e
∗/
private Document ge tSta t e ( ) {
byte [ ] theva l = ba l s ta te msg . getValue ( ) ;
theva l [ 0 ] = 0 ;
theva l [ 1 ] = s t a t e ;
return ba l s ta te msg ;
}
/∗∗
∗ re turn the seq no and the name o f the purse used in




private Document getData ( ) {
Document [ ] thedocs = getdata msg . getDocs ( ) ;
byte [ ] nameval = thedocs [ 0 ] . getValue ( ) ;
byte [ ] s eqnova l = thedocs [ 1 ] . getValue ( ) ;
U t i l . arrayCopy (name , ( short ) 0 , nameval , ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) 8 ) ;
U t i l . s e tShor t ( seqnoval , ( short ) 0 , sequenceNo ) ;
return getdata msg ;
}
/∗∗
∗ re turn the curren t ba lance o f the purse
∗
∗ @return ba l
∗/
private Document getBalance ( ) {
Ut i l . s e tShor t ( ba l s ta te msg . getValue ( ) , ( short ) 0 ,
ba lance ) ;
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